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WHEN LAUNDRY BECOMES DEADLY: WHY THE EXTENSION OF
DUTY PAST SPOUSES IN SCHWARTZ v. ACCURATUS CORP.
HOLDS THE RIGHT PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE
FOR TAKE-HOME TOXIC TORTS
NICOLE WARD*
“[T]he evolution of case law must reflect the simultaneous evolution
of societal values and public policy.”1
I. THE SILENT KILLER ON YOUR WORK CLOTHES: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE TAKE-HOME TOXIC TORT THEORY OF LIABILITY
The legal profession is no stranger to toxic tort theory liability.2  Every
jurisdiction has recognized a cause of action for a person who has been
sufficiently exposed to harmful chemicals, such as asbestos or beryllium,
and has developed a disease or passed away due to the exposure.3  Toxic
tort cases are so prevalent that “[a]sbestos litigation is the longest-running
mass tort litigation in the United States.”4  Thousands of new cases are
filed every year, and that number has stayed fairly consistent.5  A large part
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2015, Rowan University.  I would like to thank my mother, father, and sister,
who are my constant and unfailing source of support and encouragement.  I am
also especially grateful to those who provided feedback and input in writing this
Note, especially my senior staff editor.  I would also like to thank the Villanova Law
Review and everyone whose work went into publication of this Note.
1. Schwartz v. Accuratus Corp., 139 A.3d 84, 90 (N.J. 2016) (citing Hopkins v.
Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1121 (N.J. 1993)) (holding employer liable to
employee’s girlfriend and roommate under take-home toxic tort theory).
2. See Mark S. Dennison & Warren Freedman, Handling Toxic Tort Litigation,
57 AM. JUR. TRIALS 395 § 6, at 415–17 (1996) (discussing factual and legal back-
ground of toxic tort liability).  The first toxic tort theory cases were filed in the
1970s. See id. § 5, at 414 (outlining history of toxic torts); Richard A. Solomon,
Clearing the Air: Resolving the Asbestos Personal Injury Litigation Crisis, 2 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REP. 125, 125–26 (1991) (outlining history of toxic torts).  Since then,
toxic torts have become a common claim. See id. (discussing rise of toxic torts).
3. See Dennison & Friedman, supra note 2, § 7, at 418 (“Most toxic tort cases
are based on common law theories of liability because environmental statutes gen-
erally restrict the amount and type of recovery available to injured plaintiffs.  Gen-
erally, the great various common law causes of action favor plaintiffs in their legal
claims.” (footnote omitted)).
4. See Rebecca Leah Levine, Note, Clearing the Air: Ordinary Negligence in Take-
Home Asbestos Exposure Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 359, 359 (2011); see also Helen E.
Freedman, Selected Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 511, 511
(2008) (recognizing magnitude and prevalence of asbestos cases).
5. See KCIC, Asbestos Litigation: 2015 Year in Review 2 (2016), http://riskybusi
ness.kcic.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Asbestos2015YearInReview-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DY3Z-UZH6].  KCIC, a corporate risk management and risk
analysis firm, estimated that there were 4,820 asbestos claims filed in 2014, and
(457)
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of these toxic tort cases and the derivative focus of this Note involve expo-
sure to these substances in the workplace.6  What is already a complex
theory of liability has grown even more complex in recent years as some
courts have begun to recognize what is known as the “take-home toxic tort
theory of liability.”7  At the heart of this theory is, believe it or not,
clothing.8
The theory arises from the unfortunate fact that harmful substances
are not just left at the workplace when employees leave.9  Often, workers
bring these chemicals home on their clothes, exposing their family mem-
bers and roommates to harmful substances, as well.10  These third parties
are exposed to harmful chemicals if they do laundry and shake out the
clothes, if they come into physical contact with the person wearing the
clothes, or if they are exposed to chemicals from the clothes through parti-
cles in the air.11  The complexity of the theory centers on whether or not a
third party that develops a disease from this take-home exposure has a
cause of action against the employers, manufacturers, and premises own-
ers of the worker or place of work; more specifically, the issue is whether
or not these defendants owe a duty of care to third parties who come into
contact with harmful substances that workers bring home.12
4,465 filed in 2015. See id. (presenting statistics from 2014 and 2015 in bar graph).
KCIC “estimate[s] that [their database] captures at least 90% of the total asbestos
filings in the [United States].” Id. (describing accuracy of statistics).
6. See W. Kip Viscusi, Compensating Workplace Toxic Torts, 37 PROC. ACAD. POL.
SCI. 126, 126–27 (1988).  Viscusi explains the novelty of the problem of occupa-
tional diseases as compared to occupational injuries:
Approximately 162,000 occupational illnesses are documented annually
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  This figure probably understates
the prevalence of occupational disease, however, since other Department
of Labor statistics indicate that some 2 million people are severely or par-
tially disabled by occupational diseases, of whom 700,000 suffer long-term
total disability.
Id.
7. See generally James T. O’Reilly, How Have Courts Decided “Take-Home” Asbestos
Exposure Claims?, 1 TOXIC TORTS PRAC. GUIDE § 5:4 (2016) (explaining complexity
of toxic tort theory cases).
8. For an explanation of how clothes expose individuals to toxic substances,
see infra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
9. See O’Reilly, supra note 7, at § 5:4 (explaining that harmful substances can
move from workplace to home).
10. See id. (highlighting dangers of take-home toxic exposure).
11. See id. (noting several different names for this type of exposure, such as
“bystander, household, para-occupational, peripheral, secondhand, take-home,
and transmission asbestos exposure” (footnotes omitted)).
12. See Levine, supra note 4, at 364–65, 376 (discussing how individuals are
“indirectly exposed” to toxic chemicals, novelty of take-home asbestos exposure
claims, and how courts have begun to analyze them).  In determining take-home
exposure claims:
The key factor that influences whether a court permits a take-home expo-
sure claim is the methodology used to analyze negligence.  Jurisdictions
that tend to permit such claims begin their analyses by focusing on
whether the harm to the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the
2
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Furthermore, there is a question as to how far the duty should extend
if courts do find a duty to third parties.13  Should the duty extend only to
spouses and members of the immediate family, or should it extend further
to include roommates and everyone living in the household?14  What
about to people who merely visit the home, or to anyone the worker comes
into contact with after work?15
Some courts have decided, for a variety of different reasons, that
there is no liability toward anyone other than the employee.16  Others,
basing their decisions on concepts of foreseeability and public policy, have
extended liability to spouses or family members.17  Recently, in Schwartz v.
Accuratus Corp.,18 the New Jersey Supreme Court was the first jurisdiction
to extend duty past partners and members of the immediate family to in-
employer’s actions.  In contrast, jurisdictions that tend not to uphold
such claims focus on the relationship between the employer and the
plaintiff.
Id. at 360–61 (footnotes omitted) (citing Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co.,
266 S.W.3d 347, 361 (Tenn. 2008)).
13. See id. at 376–83 (describing different approaches taken by courts consid-
ering extent of employer duty to third parties injured by take-home toxic
exposure).
14. For a discussion of the case Schwartz v. Accuratus Corp., in which this ques-
tion was answered, see infra notes 91–105.
15. See Schwartz v. Accuratus Corp., 139 A.3d 84, 91 (N.J. 2016) (“We note
that no precedent from another jurisdiction, in a non-strict liability setting, has
found a duty in a take-home toxic tort cause of action outside of a factual setting
involving household members, presumably because of the idiosyncratic nature of
most other interactions with a take-home toxin.” (citing Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid,
905 So. 2d 465, 483 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 374–75)).
16. See Riedel v. ICI Americas Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 26 (Del. 2009) (finding em-
ployer did not owe duty to employee’s wife who developed asbestosis due to take-
home exposure).  In Riedel, an employee’s wife brought a claim against her hus-
band’s employer after contracting asbestosis. See id. at 19.  The wife alleged the
employer “failed to prevent her husband from taking asbestos home on his cloth-
ing and failed to warn [them] of the dangers of asbestos exposure.” See id. at 18
(discussing plaintiff’s claim).  The Delaware Supreme Court concluded there was
no “legally significant relationship” between the wife and the employer, and there-
fore, the employer owed no duty to the wife. See id. at 25; see also Martin v. Cincin-
nati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding no duty because it
was not reasonably foreseeable to employer that asbestos particles on worker’s
clothes would cause harm to worker’s children forty years later), abrogation recog-
nized by In re Abestos Litig., C.A. No. N14C-01-287 ASB, 2017 WL 465301 (Del.
Super. Feb. 2, 2017).  The Martin court explained, “These state court decisions do
not reach a uniform result, but we find the cases declining to find a duty to be
more persuasive . . . .  Accordingly, we find that defendants did not owe a duty to
[the employee].” Id. at 446 (discussing holding).
17. See, e.g., Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 375 (stating that, based on facts in plain-
tiff’s complaint, employer may have owed duty to employee’s daughter injured by
take-home asbestos exposure).  The plaintiff in Satterfield, the daughter of an em-
ployee, was exposed to asbestos-contaminated work clothes from the day she was
born, and she died of mesothelioma at age 25. See id. at 351–53.
18. 139 A.3d 84 (N.J. 2016).
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clude roommates and other unrelated members of the household.19  This
Note agrees with the decision in Schwartz that take-home toxic tort liability
and the legal duty of employers should be extended to third parties, in-
cluding family members, roommates, and other household members.20
This Note further argues that other courts should adopt this approach
because the dangers are foreseeable and employers and manufacturers are
in the best position to pay the costs of preventing the associated harm and
of damages.21
The Note consists of seven parts.  Part II describes the issues in prov-
ing toxic tort liability and how courts have decided issues in take-home
toxic tort theory liability cases.22  Part III details the applicable case law
that led to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s recent decision in this area.23
Part IV details the facts and procedural history of Schwartz v. Accuratus
Corp.24  Part V examines the reasoning behind the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s decision to extend duty and liability to unrelated third parties.25
Part VI discusses the relevant policy considerations both in favor of and
against the extension of duty in take-home toxic tort theory cases and ex-
plains why the decision in Schwartz highlights notions of fairness and sup-
ports the public interest.26  Part VII focuses on the impact of the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s decision and discusses where this area of law is
headed.27
19. See id. at 90–91 (holding duty recognized in prior case law not intended to
stay static and prior case law did not suggest that duty cannot extend beyond
spouses).
20. For a further discussion on the necessity of extending a legal duty to third
parties, see infra notes 136–45 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of why the dangers are foreseeable and why em-
ployers and landowners are in the best position to pay to prevent the associated
harm and pay for damages caused, see infra notes 112–30 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the prior case law of the take-home toxic tort
theory of liability and how courts have decided on the important issues in litiga-
tion, see infra notes 28–51 and accompanying text.
23. For a thorough discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in
Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., the case leading up to Schwartz, see infra notes 52–72
and accompanying text.
24. For further discussion of the facts and procedural history of Schwartz, see
infra notes 73–88 and accompanying text.
25. For further discussion of the reasoning behind the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s decision to extend duty and liability to unrelated third parties, see infra
notes 89–105 and accompanying text.
26. For further discussion of the considerations both in favor of and against
extending duty in take-home toxic tort litigation, see infra notes 106–34 and ac-
companying text.
27. For further discussion of the impact of Schwartz, see infra notes 135–45
and accompanying text.
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss2/6
2017] NOTE 461
II. ESTABLISHING DUTY AND CAUSATION: THE BACKGROUND OF PROVING
AND ANALYZING TOXIC TORT CLAIMS
Proving liability in toxic tort theory cases can be difficult.28  In order
to show a defendant is liable, a plaintiff first needs to show the defendant
actually caused the injury and that the defendant breached a duty of care
in doing so.29  The following paragraphs outline the issues in toxic tort
theory litigation and how courts have handled them.30
A. Shaking out the Basics: What Is Toxic Tort Theory Liability?
Generally, “[t]oxic torts arise from wrongful actions or omissions that
present unreasonable risks to human health and the environment.”31  In
toxic tort litigation, a person, or family member on behalf of a person,
alleges that a substantial amount of exposure to a harmful substance has
caused serious harm, sickness, or even death.32  Further, “toxic torts gen-
erally involve varied injuries and diseases that can occur unexpectedly and
recurrently, and which are usually alleged to have been caused by expo-
sure to toxic substances, liquids, gases, vapors, particulates, or dust, which
may be unidentifiable or even latent for long periods of time.”33  Toxic
tort claims are usually based upon theories of negligence or strict liability,
but they can encompass a number of other claims, as well.34
Toxic tort litigation presents many complex problems with which
courts still struggle today.35  One of the biggest issues within toxic tort
28. See RHON E. JONES & MARK ENGLEHART, LITIGATING TOXIC TORTS 1 (2007),
http://www.beasleyallen.com/webfiles/Litigating%20Toxic%20Torts.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/BJ9E-H5ZY] (explaining that litigating toxic tort cases “can be intimi-
dating” due to issues in development and identification of injury and proof of
causation).
29. See id. at 2 (explaining that “[a] successful toxic tort plaintiff must estab-
lish legal and medical causation” (citing Christopher Callahan, Establishment of
Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 605 (1991))).
30. For a further discussion of issues in toxic tort litigation and how courts
have previously handled them, see infra notes 31–51 and accompanying text.
31. Dennison & Freedman, supra note 2, at § 4, at 414 (defining “toxic torts”).
32. See id. (providing examples of toxic torts).
33. Id. (discussing typical causes of injuries in toxic tort cases).
34. See id. at § 1, at 410 (explaining that plaintiff generally has to prove:
(1) “[p]laintiff was exposed to a disease-causing agent or substance”;
(2) “[d]efendant is legally responsible for plaintiff’s exposure to the . . . sub-
stance”; (3) “[p]laintiff has suffered or is currently suffering from exposure”; and
(4) that exposure was proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury); see id. at §§ 7–18, at
418–34 (discussing various grounds and theories of toxic tort liability, including
trespass, nuisance, negligence, emotional distress, fear of future disease, strict
products liability, misrepresentation and fraud, and failure to warn).
35. See Stephen Blacklocks & Michael Kruse, Proof of Causation in Recent Prod-
uct Liability Cases, LAW360 (Apr. 30, 2008), https://www.hunton.com/files/Publica-
tion/028884d3-fc53-4773-88b8-83c8885e0197/Presentation/PublicationAttach
ment/2c9a4650-f252-4e1f-8370-3a83771688f1/Proof_Of_Causation.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V9BH-R7LL] (stating “courts are still grappling with what each step [of
proving toxic tort liability] demands of a plaintiff”).
5
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litigation is proof of causation, both factual and proximate.36  With re-
spect to proximate causation, toxic tort injuries or diseases often lay dor-
mant or undiagnosed for many years, and it can be difficult to trace the
origin of the injury.37  Moreover, one commentator has noted that in cases
where a plaintiff has a disease that can stem from a variety of causes, it can
be difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the exposure to the harmful sub-
stance was the factual and only possible cause of the disease or injury.38
Plaintiffs who cannot prove that the disease or injury was the direct result
of the exposure to the harmful substance cannot succeed on a negligence
claim.39  For these reasons, courts struggle with balancing relief for the
plaintiff with acting fairly towards the defendant in toxic tort litigation.40
36. See id. (discussing issues with causation).  Plaintiffs must prove both gen-
eral causation—that the substance could cause the plaintiff’s injury or disease—and
specific causation—that it was the “exposure to the toxin did in fact cause [the
plaintiff’s] injury.” See id. (discussing difference between general and specific cau-
sation).  For a further discussion of proof of causation in a toxic tort case, see
Andrews v. U.S. Steel Corp., 250 P.3d 887, 890 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Norris
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 881 (10th Cir. 2005)) (stating “evidence
must show both ‘general causation’ and ‘specific causation’” to succeed in toxic
tort cases).
37. See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Sub-
stances Litigation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 965, 973 (1988) (acknowledging “lengthy la-
tency periods from exposure [to toxic substances] to clinical manifestations of
disease”).
38. See Viscusi, supra note 6, at 126–27 (discussing factors that complicate ef-
forts to understand scope of occupation disease problem).
Although there are some “signature” diseases, such as mesothelioma,
whose relationship to a particular kind of exposure is well established,
most chronic illnesses can be caused by exposure to any of several sub-
stances or by participation in any of several activities.  Lung cancer, for
example, may result from air pollution, cigarette smoke, asbestos, or
many other carcinogens.  Thus it may be quite difficult to disentangle the
occupational contribution to someone’s disease.
Id. at 127.
39. See JONES & ENGLEHART, supra note 28, at 2. (explaining “[p]laintiff’s ex-
posure and subsequent disease must be causally related and not simply a coinci-
dence” (citing Andrew A. Marino & Lawrence E. Marino, The Scientific Basis of
Causality, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (1995))).  “[The] plaintiff must offer proof that
the exposure to the toxin was a substantial factor in causing . . . [the] disease.” Id.;
see also Johnson v. Arkema, Inc., 685 F.3d 452, 457–58 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(affirming grant of summary judgment for employers because plaintiff “was unable
to prove causation”).  In Johnson, an employee filed a personal injury suit against
his employer after developing “severe restrictive lung disease and pulmonary fibro-
sis.” See id. at 457.  At the glass bottling plant, the employee was exposed to “a
chemical known as Certincoat,” which “is composed mostly of monobutyltin
trichloride.” See id.  Although the plaintiff provided expert testimony regarding a
link between the chemicals he was exposed to and restrictive lung disease, he had
insufficient evidence to prove specific causation or that the exposure was sufficient
to be the specific and sole cause of the illness. See id. at 472 (discussing problems
with plaintiff’s argument).
40. See Yelena Kotlarsky, Note, The “Peripheral Plaintiff”: Duty Determinations in
Take-Home Asbestos Cases, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 456–57 (2012) (stating after
defendant is determined to be cause of injury, “it must still [be] determine[d]
whether the defendant should be held responsible for that harm” (citing WILLIAM
6
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B. Foreseeability Is Key: How Courts Have Decided
Take-Home Toxic Tort Cases
In order for a defendant to be liable to a plaintiff, it must first owe a
duty of care to the plaintiff.41  Analyzing whether there is a duty of care
has been the main source of conflict among state courts in regard to the
take-home toxic tort theory of litigation.42  Cases examining duty in take-
home toxic tort claims often fall into three distinct classes: “(1) cases that
focus on the foreseeability of the injury; (2) cases that focus on the legal
relationship, or the lack of one, between the parties; and (3) cases that
focus on the situs of the exposure, that is, whether the exposure occurred
on the defendant’s premises.”43
Where courts have used the foreseeability of harm as the principal
consideration in duty analysis, they have generally found a duty of care to
third parties.44  When considering foreseeability, courts generally find that
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 244 (4th ed. 1971); JOHN C.P.
GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW:
TORTS 103–09 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010))).
41. See Dennison & Freedman, supra note 2, at § 11, at 422–24 (discussing
background of toxic tort liability and elements of negligence).
42. See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 372 (Tenn.
2009) (discussing  “split of authority” throughout country on issue of whether em-
ployers have duty to third parties exposed to take-home asbestos).  Courts have
acknowledged there is a divide among state courts: “Courts across the country have
disagreed as to how these broad principles of tort law should be used to determine
whether an employer owes a duty to persons who develop asbestos-related illnesses
after exposure to asbestos fibers on its employees’ clothing.” Id. at 361 (noting
split between courts on issue of take-home toxic tort liability).
43. David M. Melancon, Airing Asbestos Litigation’s Dirty Laundry: “Take-Home”
Asbestos Exposure and the Ongoing Efforts to Determine the Scope of the Duty of Premises
Owners and Employers, FOR DEF., Apr. 2016, at 48–49 (analyzing duty in toxic tort
liability cases).  These three categories encompass the majority of take-home toxic
tort liability analyses. See id. (discussing three “primary” approaches taken by
courts analyzing duty in take-home asbestos exposure cases).  For examples of
cases in the first category, see infra notes 127–28.  For examples of cases in the
second category, see infra note 49.  For examples of cases in the third category, see
infra note 133.
44. See Simpkins v. CSX Corp., 929 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (holding
employer has duty to protect employees’ wives from exposure), aff’d sub nom Simp-
kins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 1092 (2012).  In Simpkins, the plaintiff, a
railroad worker’s wife, contracted mesothelioma after being “exposed to asbestos
fibers brought home on the work clothes of her husband” and eventually died of
mesothelioma cancer. See id. at 1258.  The court found that “every person owes
every other person the duty to use ordinary care to prevent any injury that might
naturally occur as the reasonably foreseeable consequence of his or her own ac-
tions.” Id. at 1261–62 (citing Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 864 N.E.2d 227, 238 (Ill.
2007)) (discussing universal duty of care).  The court found it was “foreseeable
that the wife of an asbestos-exposed worker would also be exposed to asbestos dust
through washing his clothing,” and therefore, the employer owes a duty to a
worker’s wife. See id. at 1265–66 (holding employer liable).  Furthermore, the
court reasoned that the employer could have reduced the risk of exposure by “pro-
viding warnings . . . [and] safety instructions,” or “substituting [safer] products,”
and that the burden of taking such precautions was not higher than the risk of
7
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as a matter of public policy, if employers know of the harmful substances
and do not take proper preventative precautions, it is foreseeable that the
employees will wear the clothes home and possibly expose household
members to the harmful substances.45  On the other hand, there are
courts that have conducted a foreseeability analysis and have determined
that it is, in fact, not foreseeable that exposure to chemicals at work would
harm household members.46  Consequently, these courts have not found
employers, manufacturers, or premises owners liable to third party house-
hold members.47  One of the main reasons courts have not found the dan-
ger foreseeable is that, due to the amount of time in between the exposure
and the injury, the plaintiff is often unable to prove that the “employer[ ]
injury. See id. at 1265 (implying employers are in best position to take preventative
measures).
45. See Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 905 So.2d 465, 483, 493 (La. Ct. App.
2005) (finding “general duty to act reasonably in view of the foreseeable risks of
danger to household members of [ ] employees resulting from exposure to asbes-
tos fibers carried home on [an] employee’s clothing, person, or personal effects”);
see also Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579-7-1, 2007 WL 2325214, at
*1–2, *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007) (holding employer has duty not to cause
unreasonable risk of harm and that “[e]mployers generally owe their employees a
duty to provide a reasonably safe work environment”).
Another case in which a court found a duty to take preventative action is
Chaisson v. Avondale Industries, Inc. See Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So.2d
171 (La. Ct. App. 2006).  The plaintiffs were a pipefitter and his daughters, and the
defendant was the pipefitter’s former employer. See id. at 176–77.  The court
stated that in analyzing duty:
The court may take “various moral, social, and economic factors” into
account when determining whether to impose a duty.  These factors in-
clude: 1) “the fairness of imposing liability;” 2) “the economic impact on
the defendant and on similarly situated parties;” 3) “the need for an in-
centive to prevent future harm;” 4) “the nature of defendant’s activity;”
5) “the potential for an unmanageable flow of litigation;” 6) “the histori-
cal development of precedent;” and 7) “the direction in which society
and its institutions are evolving.”
Id. at 181 (citations omitted) (quoting Fox v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ.
& Agric. & Mech. Coll., 576 So.2d 978, 981 (La. 1991)) (illustrating factors courts
should take into consideration when analyzing duty).
46. See Rohrbaugh v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 965 F.2d 844, 846 (10th
Cir. 1992) (holding that employer could not foresee that wife of insulator who
worked with asbestos products would purchase or use clothes); see also Martin v.
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding that
employer could not reasonably foresee danger presented by clothes), abrogation
recognized by In re Abestos Litig., C.A. No. N14C-01-287 ASB, 2017 WL 465301 (Del.
Super. Feb. 2, 2017).
47. See Martin, 561 F.3d at 439, 447 (holding it was not forseeable to employer
that employee’s child might be exposed to harmful chemicals).  In Martin, the
Sixth Circuit held that, although foreseeability is an important factor in determin-
ing duty, foreseeability is “determined based on ‘what the defendant knew at the
time of the alleged negligence.’” See id. at 444 (quoting Pathways, Inc. v. Ham-
mons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 90 (Ky. 2003)) (finding defendant not liable).  Noting the
exposure happened before the risks of asbestos to bystanders were widely known,
the court found that the harm was not foreseeable “because [the defendants]
neither knew [nor] should have known of the danger” of harm posed by asbestos
transported on clothes. See id. at 446–47 & n.3.
8
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generally knew of the dangers of [toxic] exposure to nonemployees” at
the time of exposure.48
On the other hand, some state courts focus on the legal relationship
between the employer or landowner and the household member to deter-
mine whether there is a duty; courts that followed this path of duty analysis
have generally found no duty, and therefore no liability.49  The third cate-
gory analyzes duty based on whether the exposure took place on the prem-
ises.50  The state courts that have adopted this duty analysis have rejected
take-home liability by reasoning that employers or landowners should be
responsible for or owe a duty only to those who are exposed to substances
on the employers’ or landowners’ premises.51
III. THE SET-UP FOR SCHWARTZ: THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT’S
EXTENSION OF DUTY TO SPOUSES IN OLIVO V.
OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC.
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Schwartz was essentially
an expansion of a case the same court decided in 2006, Olivo v. Owens-
48. See Melancon, supra note 43, at 54. (explaining why some courts have not
found harm to be foreseeable).
49. See Nelson v. Aurora Equip. Co., 909 N.E.2d 931, 1044 (Ill. Ct. App. 2009)
(finding lack of “special relationship” between defendant and plaintiff, and there-
fore finding defendant owed no duty to plaintiff); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Miller,
260 S.W.3d 515, 516 (Tex. App. 2008) (holding “Ford owed no duty to
[plaintiff]”).
In Ford, a worker brought an action against the owner of the premises where
he worked after his step-daughter died from mesothelioma. See id. at 516.  “Ro-
land’s job was to repair, tear out, and rebuild blast furnaces.” Id.  The plaintiff
“wore no protective clothing at work and did not shower or change clothes before
going home.” Id.  Further, Roland’s daughter helped wash Roland’s clothes. See
id.  Roland brought suit against the owner of the property, Ford. See id.  The Mich-
igan Supreme Court, ruling on a certified question from the Texas appellate court,
held there was no legally significant relationship between Ford and Roland’s step-
daughter, and therefore a foreseeability analysis did not even need to be con-
ducted. See In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App., 740
N.W.2d 206, 222 (Mich. 2007) (illustrating importance of relationship to duty
analysis).
50. See Dennison & Freedman, supra note 2, at § 22, at 435–36 (discussing
different ways of analyzing toxic tort theory litigation).
51. See Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ohio
2010) (holding that because exposure did not take place on premises, employer
owed no duty to wife).  In Boley, the wife of a Goodyear employee was exposed to
asbestos while doing her husband’s laundry after work. See id. at 449.  The Ohio
Supreme Court concluded that, pursuant to the applicable statute, there is no lia-
bility in take-home toxic tort cases if the “exposure [to the toxic substance] does
not occur at the premises owner’s property.” See id. at 452 (limiting extension of
duty in toxic tort cases).  The court held that there is no duty of care unless the
exposure takes place on the defendant’s premises. See id. at 453 (holding that
pursuant to statute, no duty of care was owed to employee’s wife unless exposure
occurred at owner’s property).
9
Ward: When Laundry Becomes Deadly: Why the Extension of Duty past Spous
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
466 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: p. 457
Illinois, Inc.52  The decision in Olivo was never one the court envisioned
would remain static, nor was the duty of care to spouses that it recognized
intended to be limited to spouses.53  The following subsections will discuss
the facts and holding of the case that led up to the New Jersey high court’s
most recent decision in take-home toxic tort theory litigation.54
A. Explicating Olivo: The Facts and Procedure of the Case
The plaintiff in Olivo, Anthony Olivo, “worked as a steamfitter [and]
welder” for nearly forty years “at various industrial and commercial sites in
New Jersey.”55  Due to the nature of his work, “Anthony worked around
asbestos-containing materials” daily.56  Moreover, “when Anthony came
home from work each night[,] he would go to the basement where the
family’s washing machine was located, remove his work clothes, and
change into clean clothing that Eleanor would leave there for him,” and
Eleanor, his wife, would wash the clothes each night.57
Unfortunately, as a result of the asbestos exposure, “Anthony was di-
agnosed with [a] non-malignant asbestos-related disease [and] Eleanor
was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2000.”58  Eleanor “died shortly there-
after in 2001.”59  After her death, “Anthony filed a wrongful death action
on behalf of his deceased wife, and a survival action on his own behalf”
against a number of defendants, the relevant defendant being Exxon Mo-
bil, one of the companies “that owned the premises where the asbestos
products were used and where Anthony worked.”60  Specifically, “[t]he
complaint alleged that Eleanor contracted mesothelioma as a result of her
continuous exposure to asbestos dust that was introduced into the home
on Anthony’s work clothes” and stated “that the premises owners, includ-
52. 895 A.2d 1143 (N.J. 2006).  For a further discussion on what the New
Jersey Supreme Court clarified in Schwartz, see infra notes 69–104 and accompany-
ing text.
53. See Schwartz v. Accuratus Corp., 139 A.3d 84, 90 (N.J. 2016) (holding duty
of care articulated by court in Olivo “was not defined on the basis of [the spousal
relationship]”).
54. For a discussion of the facts of Olivo, see infra notes 55–65 and accompa-
nying text.  For a discussion of the holding of Olivo, see infra notes 66–71 and
accompanying text.
55. See Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1146 (describing plaintiff’s circumstances that gave
rise to asbestos exposure).
56. See id. (describing Anthony’s exposure to asbestos).
57. Id. (describing how plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos led to wife’s expo-
sure).  For a further discussion of how laundry can expose an individual to asbestos
particles, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
58. See Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1146 (describing plaintiff’s and plaintiff’s wife’s
illnesses).
59. Id. (explaining circumstances surrounding plaintiff’s wife’s death).
60. See id. (discussing plaintiff’s allegations).  The other defendants, for a to-
tal of thiry-two defendants, included the various “manufacturers and suppliers of
asbestos products[,] as well as companies . . . that owned the premises where . . .
[the plaintiff] worked.” See id.
10
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ing Exxon Mobil, breached their duty to maintain a safe working environ-
ment by failing to take appropriate measures to protect Anthony, and
derivatively Eleanor, from exposure to asbestos, asbestos fibers, and asbes-
tos dust.”61
Exxon Mobil filed a motion for summary judgment.62  Subsequently,
“[t]he trial court granted the motion, finding that ‘imposing an additional
duty on a landowner for asbestos related injuries that occurred off of the
premises would not be fair or just.’”63  The plaintiffs appealed, and the
appellate court reversed the decision, holding “that Exxon Mobil was ‘in
the best position to prevent the harm’ and could easily have warned work-
ers . . . of the risks of asbestos exposure” and how exposure to asbestos
could have been detrimental to their health and their spouses’ health.64
Furthermore, it could have taken measures to keep the clothes on the
premises, such as “providing changing rooms” that the workers could use
before going home for the night.65  The appellate division, however, made
it clear that “its holding was limited to a duty owed to plaintiff’s decedent-
wife.”66
B. Explicating Olivo: The Holding and Reasoning of the Case
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate de-
cision to deny summary judgment.67  The majority found that Exxon Mo-
61. Id. at 1146 (noting plaintiffs attempted to prove that Exxon owed duty to
plaintiffs and could have taken precautionary steps to help them).
62. See id. at 1146–47 (discussing procedure).  “All [other] defendants except
Exxon Mobil settled.” Id. (discussing procedural posture of case).
63. Id. at 1147 (quoting trial court).
64. See id. (quoting appeals court).
65. See id. (citations omitted) (discussing possible precautions Exxon Mobil
could have taken).  The appellate division focused on foreseeability in its analysis,
but it also considered “whether it was unfair to impose a duty of care on Exxon
Mobil for [Eleanor’s] injuries.” See id.
66. See id. (noting trial court attempted to cut off liability).  The appellate
division made this clarification to ensure that its decision did not “expose Exxon
Mobil to liability to any person harmed by coming into contact with Anthony and
his work clothes.” See id.
67. See id. at 1148 (affirming appellate division).  In arriving at its holding, the
supreme court stated that it does take foreseeability into account when analyzing
duty; however, foreseeability alone is not a determination of duty. See id. at 1148
(“Once the ability to foresee harm to a particular individual has been established,
however, considerations of fairness and policy govern whether the imposition of a
duty is warranted.” (citing Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., Leasing Div. v. EMAR
Grp., Inc., 638 A.2d 1288, 1294 (1994))).
The factors that go into the consideration of whether imposing a duty is fair
are “the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportu-
nity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution.”
See id. at 1149 (quoting Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Devs., 675 A.2d 209, 212 (N.J.
1996)).
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bil owed Eleanor a duty, even though she was a spouse, and that there
were still questions and issues to litigate at trial.68  The majority stated:
In weighing and balancing the relationship of the parties, the
nature of the risk and how relatively easy it would have been to
provide warnings to workers such as Anthony about the handling
of his clothing or to provide protective garments, we do not hesi-
tate to impose a derivative duty on Exxon Mobil for injury to
plaintiff’s spouse caused by exposure to the asbestos he brought
home on his work clothing.69
The court found the risk of injury was foreseeable because Exxon Mo-
bil knew of the dangers of asbestos and was in the “best position” to take
preventative measures to help alleviate the risk.70
However, like the appellate division, the New Jersey Supreme Court
seemed to limit the scope of its decision by stating, “The duty we recognize
in these circumstances is focused on the particularized foreseeability of
harm to plaintiff’s wife, who ordinarily would perform typical household
chores that would include laundering the work clothes worn by her hus-
68. See id. at 1151 (“Issues of fact remain as to whether asbestos exposure was
a known risk incidental to the specific work Anthony was hired to perform at the
Exxon Mobil site.”); see also id. (explaining why summary judgment motion was not
granted).
69. Id. at 1149–50 (conducting risk-benefit analysis of duty).  The decision in
Olivo, and this imposition of duty, received some negative treatment. See Ga. Pac.,
LLC v. Farrar, 69 A.3d 1028, 1039 (Md. 2013) (declining to follow imposition of
duty to household members on premises owner).  The Georgia Pacific court said:
Determining the existence of a duty requires the weighing of policy con-
siderations, among which are whether, in light of the relationship (or
lack of relationship) between the party alleged to have the duty and the
party to whom the duty is alleged to run, there is a feasible way of carry-
ing out that duty and having some reason to believe that a warning will be
effective.  To impose a duty that either cannot feasibly be implemented
or, even if implemented, would have no practical effect would be poor
public policy indeed.
Id.
70. See Olivo, 896 A.2d at 1147 (stating Exxon Mobil was in best position to
prevent harm); see also id. at 1151 (noting Exxon Mobil had duty to plaintiff if
hazard-incident-to-work exception did not apply).  The court referred to the mate-
rial available to Exxon in explaining why Exxon should have known of the risks of
asbestos, and therefore, why it should have foreseen the potential injuries. See id.
at 1149. (stating that because of materials, Exxon had reason to foresee risk of
injury).  For example, Judge LaVecchia stated:
[A] report prepared in 1937 specifically for the petroleum industry, de-
tailed the hazards associated with “occupational dust,” including asbestos
particles, which was prevalent at petroleum plants.  As early as 1916, in-
dustrial hygiene texts recommended that plant owners should provide
workers with the opportunity to change in and out of work clothes to
avoid bringing contaminants home on their clothes.
Id. (referencing materials available to Exxon Mobil).  The court reasoned that, if
these materials were available to Exxon, they either knew or should have known
about the potential harm of asbestos. See id.
12
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band.”71  The court made it clear that a duty should be imposed only inso-
far as it maintains justice and fairness.72
IV. EXPANDING ON OLIVO: THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TAKES UP A
NEW TAKE-HOME TOXIC TORT LIABILITY QUESTION IN
SCHWARTZ V. ACCURATUS CORP.
It was not until 2016, in Schwartz v. Accuratus Corp.,73 that the New
Jersey Supreme Court took up an issue in this area again.74  The issue in
Schwartz was whether “‘the premises liability rule set forth in Olivo ex-
tend[s] beyond providing a duty of care to the spouse of a person exposed
to toxic substances on the landowner’s premises, and, if so, what are the
limits on that liability rule and the associated scope of duty?’”75  The case
began in 2012 and was “[o]riginally filed in Pennsylvania state court,” but
it “was removed to the [U.S.] District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.”76
The plaintiffs in the case were Brenda Ann and Paul Schwartz, who
filed “claims of negligence, products liability, and strict liability” against
Accuratus Ceramic Corporation, a ceramic facility where Paul worked for
multiple years.77  “Brenda was diagnosed with chronic beryllium disease”
in September of 2012, which the plaintiffs believed was the result of Paul
bringing home beryllium particles on his clothes from work.78  The com-
plaint alleged that “employees at Accuratus’s facility were exposed to man-
ufacturing processes that included the production, casting, cutting,
71. See id. at 1150 (attempting to limit scope of duty).
72. See id. at 1147 (“The inquiry has been summarized succinctly as one that
‘turns on whether the imposition of such a duty satisfies an abiding sense of basic
fairness under all of the circumstances in light of considerations of public policy.’”
(quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1116 (1993))).
73. 139 A.3d 84 (N.J. 2016).
74. See id. at 85 (returning to question of duty in take-home toxic tort cases).
75. Id. at 86. (restating “question of law certified and submitted” by Third
Circuit).  The New Jersey Supreme Court took up the question at the request of
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. See id.
76. See id. at 87 (explaining procedural posture of case).
77. See id. at 86.  Paul worked at Accuratus in 1978 and 1979 as a machinist at
its facility in Washington, New Jersey. See id.
78. See id.; see also Beryllium Disease, CLEVELAND CLINIC, http://my.cleveland
clinic.org/health/diseases_conditions/hic_Beryllium_Disease [https://perma.cc/
NWH8-Q32J] (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).  The Cleveland Clinic says:
When a person begins to develop CBD [chronic beryllium disease], in-
flammation (swelling) occurs in the lungs because they are reacting to a
foreign object.  The lungs’ typical response to the beryllium exposure is
to develop collections of cells known as granulomas that may eventually
cause scarring within the lungs.  This scarring, in turn, reduces the lungs’
ability to function.  Over time, the inflammation response continues, and
eventually symptoms may appear, including: [d]ifficulty breathing/short-
ness of breath[,] [w]eakness[,] [f]atigue[,] [l]oss of appetite[,] [w]eight
loss, [j]oint pain, [c]ough [and] fever.
Id.
13
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grinding, and cleaning of beryllium oxide ceramics and other materials
containing beryllium.”79  The plaintiffs alleged that these manufacturing
processes could cause beryllium particles to “become suspended in the air
and [ ] [become] inhaled.”80  Furthermore, if a facility did not have
proper hygiene or ventilation, the beryllium particles could settle on the
clothes and shoes of the workers and could be “transported into employ-
ees’ automobiles and homes.”81
An important factor that makes the Schwartz case different than most
other take-home toxic tort claims is that, at the time Brenda was exposed
to the beryllium particles from Paul’s clothes, Paul and Brenda were not
married.82  Furthermore, Brenda was not even living with Paul, although
she often stayed overnight and “performed laundry and other chores.”83
The fact that Brenda and Paul were neither married at the time of expo-
sure nor were they related created an issue that had not been decided by
any court.84
The plaintiffs moved to remand back to state court, but the motion
was denied.85  Eventually, the court granted the defendants’ motion to
79. See Schwartz, 139 A.3d at 86 (discussing plaintiffs’ allegations regarding
exposure to beryllium particles).
80. See id. at 87 (“According to plaintiffs, in industrial settings, any action that
disturbs the surface layer of beryllium will produce particles that become sus-
pended in the air and can be inhaled.”); see also id. (discussing complaint, which
alleged beryllium particles can easily “spread throughout [work] facility,” attach to
clothes, and travel home with employees on clothing).
81. See id. (“[P]laintiffs maintain that studies show that, once a home environ-
ment is contaminated with beryllium, ordinary household chores such as vacuum-
ing and dusting can re-suspend beryllium particles, causing persons in the home to
be repeatedly exposed to beryllium.”).
82. See id. at 86 (noting Paul’s exposure to berrylium began prior to marriage
with Brenda).
83. See id. (discussing chores performed by Brenda that led to exposure).
84. See id. (noting Paul’s employment preceded his marriage to Brenda).
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to extend the duty only to spouses or other
members of the family. See, e.g., Gillen v. Boeing Co., 40 F. Supp. 3d 534, 542 (E.D.
Pa. 2014) (holding that although individual may be foreseeable plaintiff, “the spec-
ter of limitless liability . . . weighs heavily against this Court imposing such a duty”
on that individual (citing Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 116, 1168–69 (Pa. 2000))).
85. See Schwartz, 139 A.3d at 87.  In denying the remand, the federal court
noted that neither New Jersey nor Pennsylvania “has recognized the duty of a
[landowner or] employer to protect a worker’s non-spouse . . . [or] roommate.”
See id.  Later, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, stating
“that to interpret Olivo as supporting a duty to Brenda would ‘stretch the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s decision . . . beyond its tensile strength.’” See id. (quoting
federal district court).
The court added, concerning whether Altemose’s employment could sup-
ply a liability link between Brenda and Accuratus, that “it is hard to imag-
ine where the foreseeability link could ever be severed” if “New Jersey law
[were to] find a foreseeable duty owed by an employee . . . to another
employee’s non-spouse visitor/co-habitant.”
Id. (alteration in original).
14
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dismiss.86  In granting the motion, “[t]he court concluded as a matter of
law that Brenda was not owed a duty of care by Accuratus.”87  After an-
other year of additional procedural filings, the plaintiffs filed a notice of
appeal with the Third Circuit, which in turn filed a “Petition for Certifica-
tion of a Question of State Law” with the New Jersey Supreme Court.88
V. LOOKING PAST FORESEEABILITY: OUTLINING THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION IN SCHWARTZ V. ACCURATUS CORP.
The answer to the proposed question of duty seemed to be an obvious
one to the New Jersey Supreme Court.89  The holding of Schwartz was not
a novel or outlandish holding, but rather, was an expansion of the rule
determined in Olivo.90  The high court found that the duty of care it rec-
ognized in Olivo was not meant to “remain static.”91  The court explained
that the establishment of duty in Olivo was not based on the spousal rela-
tionship between Eleanor and Anthony, but was instead based on it being
“foreseeable that [Eleanor] would handle and launder her husband’s
soiled and contaminated clothes.”92  The court recognized the impor-
tance of adaptability in the common law “when appropriate to accommo-
date new expectations and ideas” as societal values and public policy
evolve.93  In deciding Schwartz, the court declined to establish a “bright-
line rule” for determining whether there is a duty in take-home toxic tort
liability cases.94  It did not base its analysis on “the types of toxins” involved
in the case, “nor . . . attempt to ascertain the class of individuals to whom a
86. See id. (noting court found Accuratus could not be expected to foresee
Brenda would marry employee).
87. See id.
88. See id.; see also Schwartz v. Accuratus Corp., 118 A.3d 347, 347 (N.J. 2015)
(accepting question certified by Third Circuit).
89. See Schwartz, 139 A.3d at 90 (stating that “Olivo [did] not suggest that the
duty recognized must remain static for all future cases”).
90. See id. (“In Olivo, our [c]ourt was acting in its traditional role as a court of
common law, and one of the common law’s ‘great virtue[s]’ is that it is dynamic,
adaptable, and can evolve to accommodate changes in society.” (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting State v. Culver, 129 A.2d 715 (N.J. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925
(1957))).
91. See id. (expanding decision in Olivo).  The court explained that the deci-
sion in Olivo was only the court’s response to a question before it. See id.  The
court explained that Olivo never “state[d] . . . that a duty of care for take-home
toxic-tort liability cannot extend beyond a spouse” and further noted that the court
never “base[d] liability” on a biological or familial relationship. See id. at 91.
92. See id. at 90 (stating that liability of Exxon in Olivo was based on foresee-
ability, not spousal relationship).
93. See id. (citing Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (N.J. 1984)).  The
New Jersey Supreme Court has continuously emphasized the need for judicial in-
volvement in determining tort liability. See id.
94. See id. at 91, 92 (“[W]e cannot define the contours of the duty owed to
others in a take-home toxic tort action through a certified question of law.”).
15
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duty of care should extend.”95  Instead, the court broadened the issue of
duty and explained that the question of duty is very fact-specific, and it
should be decided using a “case-by-case assessment,” analyzing “risk, fore-
seeability, and fairness.”96
The court noted that the first factor to be addressed in a duty analysis
is foreseeability; however, it is not the only factor.97  The court stated, after
determining whether the injury is foreseeable, that “considerations of fair-
ness and policy” must play a role in the duty inquiry, as well.98  The court
then outlined a number of additional factors that courts should take into
account when analyzing duty in take-home toxic tort cases.99
The first factor the court addressed was the relationship of the par-
ties.100  This relationship analysis would assess
not only [ ] the relationship between a defendant’s employee
and the person who is exposed to the take-home toxin, but also
the relationship between the defendant itself and the injured
person, in determining whether it would be foreseeable, predict-
able, and just to find that the defendant owed a duty of care to
that injured person or class of individuals.101
The second factor the court outlined was the “opportunity for expo-
sure to the dangerous substance and the nature of the exposure that
causes the risk of injury.”102
95. Albert L. Piccerilli, New Jersey Supreme Court Extends Take-Home Exposure
Rule, MONTGOMERY MCCRACKEN: ALERTS & RESOURCES (July 18, 2016), http://www
.mmwr.com/alert-resource/new-jersey-supreme-court-extends-take-home-expo-
sure-rule/ [https://perma.cc/VXY2-9VD8] (explaining decision in Schwartz).
96. See Schwartz, 139 A.3d at 91 (“‘[T]he anaylsis is both very fact-specific and
principled; it must lead to solutions that properly and fairly resolve the specific
case and generate intelligible and sensible rules to govern future conduct.’” (quot-
ing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1116 (N.J. 1993))).
97. See id. at 88 (quoting Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1148 (N.J.
2006)) (stating duty of care question for take-home toxic tort liability “devolves to
a question of foreseeability”).
98. See id. (quoting Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1143).
99. See id. (determining most important aspects of duty).
100. See id. (explaining relationship is “relevant and weighty” to duty anaylsis
(citing Hopkins, 625 A.2d at 1110)).  Some jurisdictions have rejected duty alto-
gether based on a lack of relationship between the employer and the affected
party. See id. (citing Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid, 905 So. 2d 465, 483 (La. Ct. App.
2005)) (noting no precedent from “non-strict liability jurisdiction” has found duty
outside of factual setting involving household members).  The New Jersey Su-
preme Court stated that a relationship is not dispositive of duty, but that it is cer-
tainly a relevant factor. See id. (explaining that presence of relationship can help
determine whether injury was foreseeable).
101. Id. (explaining how to consider relationship factor).
102. See id. at 91–92. (discussing factors in analyzing duty).  For example, in a
case where the employee is more directly exposed to the harmful substance, such
as the employee in Chaisson who scraped asbestos insulation off pipes, the expo-
sure to third parties might be more foreseeable. See Chaisson v. Avondale Indus.,
Inc., 947 So. 2d 171, 183 (noting employee’s clothes were often dusty after work).
16
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The third factor the court discussed involved “tak[ing] into account
the employer’s knowledge of the dangerousness of exposure, assessed at
the time when the exposure to the individual occurred and not later,
when greater information may become available.”103  Finally, the court
discussed “the dangerousness of the toxin, how it causes injury, and the
reasonable precautions to protect against [it].”104  The court concluded
that, after weighing these factors, it could apply “the duty of care recog-
nized in Olivo,” the duty of care employers owed to their employees’
spouses, “to a plaintiff who is not a spouse.”105
VI. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER: WHAT DOES THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION IN SCHWARTZ MEAN?
The court’s decision in Schwartz is the first of its kind in that no other
jurisdiction has extended the duty of employers past their employees’
spouses or immediate family members.106  The court in Schwartz sup-
103. See Schwartz, 139 A.3d at 92; see also Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co.,
561 F.3d 439, 446 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding defendant not liable because exposure
happened before risks of asbestos were widely known); Bobo v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
138 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1298 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (concluding “[t]he foreseeability of
the harm . . . was evident from the very nature of the relevant OSHA regulations
and [the company’s] internal standards”).
The Bobo court found that the OSHA regulations promulgated in 1970 and
the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) own internal safety regulations were put
into place with “the goal of preventing asbestos fibers from clinging to an em-
ployee’s street clothes.” See id. at 1309 (recognizing that regulations mandated
“two lockers for each employee . . . separate changing facilities, and showers for [ ]
employees”).  The court found that if the TVA took these steps to prevent the
harm of toxins attaching to its employees’ clothes, then the risk of injury was fore-
seeable. See id.  The court then found that if the risk of injury was foreseeable,
TVA owed a duty to its employee’s wife. See id.
104. See Schwartz, 139 A.3d at 92.  Asbestos, for example, is an extremely dan-
gerous toxin. See Asbestos, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www
.osha.gov/SLTC/asbestos/ [https://perma.cc/TLW5-GY95] (last visited Apr. 7,
2017) (explaining dangers of asbestos).  The Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration (OSHA) has determined there is no safe level of asbestos exposure.
See id. (explaining how OSHA has regulated asbestos).  OSHA states:
Every occupational exposure to asbestos can cause injury of disease; every
occupational exposure to asbestos contributes to the risk of getting an
asbestos related disease.  Where there is exposure, employers are re-
quired to further protect workers by establishing regulated areas, control-
ling certain work practices and instituting engineering controls to reduce
the airborne levels.
Id. (footnote omitted) (explaining OSHA’s requirements for employers).
105. See Schwartz, 139 A.3d at 92 (holding duty of care “may . . . extend be-
yond a spouse of a worker”).  The court cautioned that there are limitations to this
duty, which it has recognized in previous cases. See id. (stating “chance contact
with a worker transporting home a toxic substance from another’s premises should
not suffice to create a duty of care” (citing Estate of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus,
69 A.3d 1247, 1262 (N.J. 2013))).
106. See Schwartz, 139 A.3d at 91 (citing Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid, 905 So. 2d
465, 483 (La. Ct. App. 2005)) (stating that no other “jurisdiction . . . has found a
duty . . . outside of a factual setting involving household members”).
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ported its decision by asserting that the outcome of this case was in line
with notions of “societal values and public policy,” as well as fairness.107  A
discussion of these notions of public policy, societal values, and fairness
can be determinative in deciding whether extending the duty of care in
take-home toxic tort theory cases is something that all jurisdictions should
do.108
A. The Good: Policy Considerations in Favor of Extending Duty in Take-Home
Toxic Tort Theory Liability
Because employers have the opportunity and resources to prevent
both the exposure to the harmful substances and the harm that results
from the employers carrying the substances home after work, there is a
compelling reason to impose a duty of care onto employers or premises
owners.109  Employers can prevent exposure by taking a number of differ-
ent precautions; for example, employers can provide changing stations so
employees can change their clothes after work, on-site laundry, work
clothes such as overalls or coveralls that can be left at work at the end of
the day, or showers or sanitation stations employees can use to clean them-
selves.110  These precautions are neither overly burdensome nor expensive
for employers or premises owners.111  On the other hand, the risk of in-
jury if these preventative measures are not taken is extremely high because
the exposure to harmful substances can lead to severe illness or even
death.112  Because the burden of preventing the harm is relatively small
107. See id. at 90–91 (discussing Olivo).
108. For a further discussion of the considerations both in favor of and
against extending duty in take-home toxic tort litigation, see infra notes 109–34
and accompanying text.
109. See Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1147 (N.J. 2006) (noting
landownders and premises owners are in “the best position to prevent the harm”
(quoting Olivo v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 872 A.2d 814 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2005)).  For a discussion of the reasoning in Olivo, see supra notes 67–72 and ac-
companying text.
110. See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tenn.
2008) (stating possible precautions Alcoa could have taken to prevent harm); see
also Simpkins v. CSX Corp., 929 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (alleging
employer could have reduced risk of exposure by “substituting other products,
providing warnings of the danger, providing safety instructions, testing the prod-
ucts, and requiring hygienic practices”).
111. See Simpkins 929 N.E.2d at 1265 (finding that “burden of guarding
against take-home asbestos exposure is not unduly burdensome when compared to
the nature of risk to be protected against”); see also West v. E. Tenn. Pioneer Oil
Co., 172 S.W.3d 545, 551 (Tenn. 2005) (“This Court has held that a risk is unrea-
sonable, ‘if the foreseeable probability and gravity of harm posed by defendant’s
conduct outweigh the burden upon defendant to engage in alternative conduct
that would have prevented the harm.’” (quoting Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d
323, 329 (Tenn. 2003))).
112. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www
.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/risk/substances/asbestos/asbestos-
fact-sheet#q3 [https://perma.cc/LQ2E-9X59] (last visited Apr. 7, 2017) (explain-
ing that research suggests that exposure to asbestos can lead to “lung cancer and
18
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compared to the gravity of the potential injuries, employers should be
held liable when they do not take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of
their employees and their employees’ families.113
Another policy consideration that weighs in favor of extending duty
in these cases is that employers are not only in the best position to know
how to prevent the harm, but also to know of the harm.114  Because all
employers and premises owners have to follow safety regulations, such as
the ones that OSHA promulgates, they already know how dangerous some
of these substances are and have guidelines to help limit exposure.115  Fur-
thermore, employers often have their own safety regulations that they cre-
ate based on their knowledge of the substances their employees will
encounter.116  Many courts recognize that access to this information,
along with other information such as warnings from manufacturers, cre-
ates a duty to warn employees of the potential health risks of exposure.117
mesothelioma . . . gastrointestinal and colorectal cancers,” asbestosis, and other
“permanent lung damage”); see also Public Health Statement for Benzene, AGENCY FOR
TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY (Aug. 2007), https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/
phs/phs.asp?id=37&tid=14 [https://perma.cc/FZX2-DY8X] (noting exposure to
benzene can lead to leukemia and other forms of cancer, as well as birth defects
and other serious health risks).
113. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(detailing risk-benefit duty analysis); see also id. (“If the probability [of injury] be
called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less
than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B is less than PL.”).
114. See Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 665 (1st Cir. 1999) (not-
ing amount of access to information defendant had about benzene).  In Curtis, the
defendant employer arranged for an engineer to explain to them the dangers of
benzene, to which their workers would be exposed:
After his visit, [a senior engineer] promptly wrote a letter to M&S reiterat-
ing the dangers of benzene and identifying six safety items that M&S
would have to complete before DuPont would deliver [heavy aromatic
distillate (HAD)] to the refinery.  These items included providing ben-
zene awareness training to the operators and mechanics responsible for
unloading and processing HAD; developing procedures for unloading
and processing HAD; providing safety showers and eyewash facilities at
the barge unloading area; making available and using proper protective
equipment; providing employee benzene exposure monitoring; and pro-
viding temporary or permanent benzene warning signs.
Id. (explaining engineer’s visit and information given to defendant).
115. See Asbestos, supra note 104 (showing guidelines regarding employee ex-
posure to which employers have access); see also Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc.,
947 So.2d 171, 183–84 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that because company was
aware of 1972 OSHA standards regarding hazards of household asbestos exposure,
it had duty to protect third-party household members from exposure at jobsite that
it knew contained asbestos).
116. See Genereux v. Am. Beryillia Corp., 577 F.3d 350, 367 (1st Cir. 2009)
(noting that “because of its concern about beryllium dust, [employer] created
safety policies for opening packages containing beryllium and for sandblasting be-
ryllium oxide ceramics”).
117. See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tenn.
2008).  The court noted,
Contrary to the OSHA regulations, Alcoa failed to educate Mr. Satterfield
and its other employees regarding the risk of asbestos or how to handle
19
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While employers generally know more about the substances their em-
ployees are working with, the employees might not know the extent of the
harm of the substances they are working with, or even what substances
they are working with.118  Therefore, because employers have access to
access to relevant information and safety regulations, even if the employ-
ers claim they did not foresee the dangers of take-home exposure, there is
often enough evidence to prove that they should have foreseen the
dangers.119
Additionally, there is a question of culpability in take-home toxic tort
theory cases: If a spouse or roommate contracts a life-threatening disease
materials containing asbestos.  Even though Alcoa’s employees worked
extensively with materials containing asbestos, these materials did not
contain warning labels or notices stating that they contained asbestos.
Despite the fact that Alcoa was aware of the dangers posed by asbestos
before Mr. Satterfield became an employee, it failed to apprise him or its
other employees of the dangers of asbestos or specifically of the danger
associated with wearing home their asbestos-contaminated work clothes.
Id. at 352; see also Frieder v. Long Island R.R., 966 N.Y.S.2d 835, 839 (Sup. Ct. 2013)
(holding that owners that have control over premises are ones who are best able to
identify and know about use of harmful chemicals on their property, and therefore
prevent harm).  The Long Island Railroad was held liable because it “had exclusive
control over the working conditions within the repair yard,” as well as the employ-
ers. See id. (holding LIRR was in best position to know about use of asbestos).
118. See Anderson v. A.J. Friedman Supply Co., 3 A.3d 545, 550 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 2010) (asserting plaintiff never knew he was exposed to asbestos at his job).  In
Anderson, “plaintiffs Bonnie and John Anderson, husband and wife, allege[d] that
Bonnie contracted mesothelioma . . . . [via] bystander exposure from laundering
[her husband]’s asbestos-laden work clothes during his employment with Exxon.”
See id. at 554.  The discussion of the employee’s job duties included that:
He worked for many years as a chemical process operator repairing
pumps and filters, which required initial removal of all covering insula-
tion.  Using chisels and hand tools, and sometimes his bare hands, he
would pull the insulation off in chunks.  Dust would fly everywhere.  Ex-
xon used insulation on all pumps, compressors, filters, and valves.  He
also would dump whole bags of raw insulation into the tanks to seal holes
in the filters and would put that same material into coffee cans when he
had to repair the filters by hand.
Id.
Bonnie would always wash his clothes and shake all the dust off of them. See
id.  The expert in the trial, a doctor specializing in “occupational and environmen-
tal medicine,” testified that due to the unseen small asbestos fibers that become
suspended in the air, often people do not know they have been exposed to asbes-
tos, so they continue to work with it. See id. at 553 (asserting exposure to asbestos
at job was most likely cause of mesothelioma).
119. See Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid, 905 So.2d 465, 466 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding defendant has general duty to act reasonably in view of foreseeable risks
of danger to household members).
[T]he plaintiff’s evidence, which consisted of a 1951 federal statute im-
posing safety standards on private companies holding public contracts,
supported the court’s finding that the risk of injury was foreseeable be-
cause the statute identified the dangers of take-home exposure and di-
rected employers to implement measures to protect against such
exposure.
See Melancon, supra note 43, at 48 (discussing Zimko, Chaisson, and other cases).
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as a result of the other spouse’s employers’ negligence, if the employer
cannot be held liable, then who can be held liable?120  It seems that, as a
matter of fairness and public policy, the spouse should be entitled to some
sort of relief and compensation.121
Lastly, there are additional policy considerations in favor of ex-
tending duty in take-home toxic tort theory cases that seem to boil down
to common sense and fairness.122  For example, rather than outright de-
clining to extend duty to any employers, it would be more fair for courts to
analyze duty on a case-by-case basis, considering several factors, as the New
Jersey Supreme Court did in Schwartz.123  After careful and thorough anal-
ysis, courts could balance the relief entitled to the plaintiffs exposed to the
harmful chemicals with the liability of defendants.124  Additionally, impos-
ing a duty on employers would be in the public interest because it would
hold employers accountable and force them to take further precautions in
protecting their employees and the public from exposure to harmful
chemicals.125
B. The Bad: Policy Considerations Against Extending Duty in Take-Home
Toxic Tort Theory Cases
Conversely, there are jurisdictions that have recognized and noted
some of the negative policy considerations that would result from ex-
tending duty in take-home toxic tort cases.126  Many courts that have de-
clined to extend duty have found issue with using foreseeability as the
120. For further discussion of causation and culpability issue in take-home
toxic tort theory litigation, see supra notes 28–40 and accompanying text.
121. See L. Neal Ellis, Jr., Introduction, in ELEMENTS OF TOXIC TORT LITIGATION
3, 6 (Arthur F. Foerster & Christine Gregorski Rolph eds., AM. BAR ASS’N 2d ed.
2013), http://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/products/books/abstracts/53502
45_chap1_abs.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q79X-YFWM] (discussing how toxic tort liti-
gation is continuing to expand, grow, and adapt, and how it now encompasses
various claims and potential damages).
122. For a further discussion of relevant policy considerations, see infra notes
123–25 and accompanying text.
123. See Schwartz v. Accuratus Corp., 139 A.3d 84, 91 (N.J. 2016) (reasoning
that courts should analyze foreseeability before considering other factors).
124. See Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So.2d 171, 183 (La. Ct. App.
2005) (holding that “the possibility of limitless liability is of no concern because
finding a duty in this case would not create a categorical duty rule, but one based
upon the facts and circumstances of this case”).
125. See id. at 183–84 (“[T]he historical precedent and development of insti-
tutional guidelines show that courts are holding companies liable for negligence
based on unsafe work conditions.  This desire for accountability is also shown in
the strengthening of OSHA regulations to allow for minimal asbestos exposure to
workers and none to household members.”).
126. For a discussion of the different reasons why courts have decided not to
extend duty in toxic tort liability cases, see supra notes 44–48 and accompanying
text.
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primary, if not only, consideration in a duty analysis.127  One of the most
recognized and discussed issues in these cases is the idea that, despite the
fact that these third parties are potentially foreseeable, extending duty in
take-home toxic tort litigation cases may create “limitless liability” on the
part of the employers and premises owners.128  Jurisdictions that have rec-
ognized and expressed this concern have struggled with determining
127. See Gillen v. Boeing Co., 40 F. Supp. 3d 534, 540 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (noting
Pennsylvania courts weigh number of different factors in determining duty).  In
Gillen, the plaintiff “developed mesothelioma as a result of direct exposure to as-
bestos . . . . [from] work[ing] as a secretary at the Boeing Vertol facility,” and
exposure as a result of doing laundry for her husband, “[who] also worked at Boe-
ing Vertol facility.” Id. at 536.  The husband was a machinist at the facility and
worked with many asbestos products and materials. See id. at 536.  The district
court in Gillen explained that Pennsylvania law illustrates that foreseeability alone
is not determinative in a duty analysis. See id. at 542. (stating that “foreseeability is
only one of five distinct factors [the] court must consider”).  The factors Penn-
sylvania courts apply in a duty analysis are “‘(1) the relationship between the par-
ties; (2) the social utility of the actor’s conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed
and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty
upon the actor; and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution.’” Id.
at 538 (quoting Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166, 1168–69 (Pa. 2000)); see also
Bootenhoff v. Hormel Foods Corp., No. CIV-11-1368-D, 2014 WL 3810383, at *3,
*6 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 1, 2014) (quoting Lowery v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 160 P.3d
959, 963 (Okla. 2007)).  The district court in Oklahoma highlighted five policy
factors to be considered in duty analysis in addition to foreseeability: “(1) the de-
gree of certainty of harm to the plaintiff; (2) moral blame attached to the defen-
dant’s conduct; (3) need to prevent future harm; (4) extent of the burden to the
defendant and consequences to the community of imposing the duty on the defen-
dant; and (5) availability of insurance for the risk involved.” Id. (citing Lowery, 160
P.3d at 964 n.4) (holding after considering policy factors, defendants did not owe
duty of care to plaintiff).
128. See In re Asbestos Litig., No. 04C-07-099-ASB, 2007 WL 4571196, at *12
(Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 21, 2007) (holding extension of duty would expose defen-
dant to “practically limitless” liability).  The Delaware Superior Court in In re Asbes-
tos Litigation found that “[t]he burden upon the defendant to undertake to warn
or otherwise protect every potentially foreseeable” person from potential exposure
would be “simply too great.” See id. (holding defendant not liable); see also In re
Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Tex., 740 N.W.2d
206, 219 (Mich. 2007) (highlighting seriousness of asbestos litigation crisis).
Premises owner liability for “take home” exposure injuries represents the
latest frontier in asbestos litigation.  These actions clearly involve highly
sympathetic plaintiffs.  Yet, as several leading courts have appreciated, the
law should not be driven by emotion or mere foreseeability.  Broader
public policy impacts must be considered, including the very real possibil-
ity that imposition of an expansive new duty on premises owners for off-
site exposures would exacerbate the current “asbestos-litigation crisis.”
Plaintiffs’ attorneys could begin naming countless employers directly in
asbestos and other mass tort actions brought by remotely exposed per-
sons such as extended family members, renters, house guests, carpool
members, bus drivers, and workers at commercial enterprises visited by
the worker when he or she was wearing dirty work clothes . . . .
Id. at 219 (quoting Mark A. Behrens & Frank Cruz-Alvarez, A Potential New Frontier
in Asbestos Litigation: Premises Owner Liability for “Take Home” Exposure Claims, 21 MEA-
LEY’S LITIG. REP. ASBESTOS 1, 4 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating
“scores of employers have been forced into bankruptcy” due to asbestos litigation).
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where to draw the line when it comes to duty.129  If duty extends to a wife
who comes into contact with an employee’s clothes, what reason would
there be not to extend the duty to everyone who comes into contact with
the employee’s clothes?130
Moreover, many courts maintain that it is not foreseeable that third
parties will be harmed by substances brought home on the clothes of em-
ployees.131  If the harm is not foreseeable, it is unfair and unjust to impose
a duty of care of employers.132  These same courts maintain that, as a mat-
ter of fairness, employers should be liable only to those who are injured on
their premises.133  Lastly, these courts argue that adopting the analysis set
129. See Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 A.2d 623, 630 (Pa. 1999).
Yes, one can reason in so many instances that an extension of liability is
merely a small step flowing naturally and logically from the existing case
law.  Yet each seemingly small step, over time, leads to an ever proliferat-
ing number of small steps that add up to huge leaps in terms of extension
of liability.  At some point it must stop . . . .
Id. (quoting Emerich v. Phila. Ctr. for Human Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1045 (Pa.
1998)).
130. See Gillen, 40 F. Supp. 3d at 541 (stating extending duty would be con-
trary to public interest).  The district court in Gillen found that imposing a duty in
take-home exposure cases would create infinite liability. See id. at 540 (“As other
courts have recognized, without a limiting principle, liability for take-home expo-
sure would essentially be infinite.  Therefore if Boeing owed Mrs. Gillen a duty, it
would similarly be said to owe a duty to children, babysitters, neighbors, dry clean-
ers, or any other person who potentially came in contact with Mr. Gillen’s clothes.”
(citation omitted) (citing In re Asbestos Litig., 2007 WL 4571196, at *12)).
131. See Alcoa, Inc. v. Behringer, 235 S.W.3d 456, 462 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007)
(holding that because exposure occurred in 1950s when dangers of asbestos dan-
ger were less known, employer “neither kn[ew] nor [could have] reasonably fore-
see[n]” that asbestos dust on workers clothes could harm household members); see
also Rohrbaugh v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 965 F.2d 844, 846 (10th Cir.
1992) (holding that under Oklahoma law, manufacturer’s “duty to warn” of dan-
gers extended only to “ordinary consumers” and not to employee’s wife).
132. See In re Asbestos Litig., 2007 WL 4571196, at *8 (“[W]here the harm is
not foreseeable, no duty can be imposed, but where the harm is foreseeable, other
factors must be considered to determine whether a duty should be imposed.”).
Many courts and scholars held that using foreseeability as the sole determination
of duty is problematic. See id. at *10 (stating duty and foreseeability are not inter-
changeable); see also Holdampf v. A.C. & S., Inc. (In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig.), 840
N.E.2d 115, 199 (N.Y. 2001) (“[F]oreseeability alone does not define duty—it
merely determines the scope of the duty once it is determined to exist.” (quoting
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (N.Y. 2001)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision
of Duty and Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV.
739, 740 (2005) (“[B]ecause duty is the sole element of negligence not left in the
first instance to the jury, duty—and hence, foreseeability—has become the pri-
mary source of judicial power to weed out cases deemed by a judge to be unwor-
thy.”); see id. (arguing foreseeability should be question for jury).
133. See Adams v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 705 A.2d 58, 66 (1998) (holding no duty
was owed to person who had never set foot on employer’s premises).  Ohio and
Kansas have both implemented statutes that eliminate any liability for premises
owners for exposures that take place away from their premises. See KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-4905(a) (West 2017) (ordering that premises owner may not be held
liable for any injury due to exposure unless injury occurred on premises); see also
23
Ward: When Laundry Becomes Deadly: Why the Extension of Duty past Spous
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
480 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: p. 457
forth in Schwartz would require a lengthy and complex analysis of duty
every time there is a toxic tort case, when these issues may be more appro-
priate for a jury.134
VII. WRAPPING UP: WHERE DOES SCHWARTZ LEAVE TAKE-HOME
TOXIC TORT THEORY LIABILITY?
The analysis set forth in Schwartz offers a useful balance between the
negative and the positive policy considerations in determining liability for
take-home toxic torts.135  An extension of duty does not create limitless
liability because the duty is not extended to anyone who comes into ran-
dom contact with the employee—it is just extended to those who live with
the employee or those who are essentially household members.136  Fur-
thermore, the analysis does not determine duty based solely on foresee-
ability; it takes a number of factors into consideration, assuring a degree of
fairness.137  Lastly, the analysis provides relief to the plaintiff and places
liability in the hands of the person who is in the best position to prevent
the harm and to pay for the damages.138
Adams v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 91404, 2009 WL 280398, at *2 (Ohio
Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2009) (holding statute precluded plaintiff from succeeding).  The
relevant Ohio statute states:
(A) The following apply to all tort actions for asbestos claims brought
against a premises owner to recover damages or other relief for exposure
to asbestos on the premises owner’s property:
(1) A premises owner is not liable for any injury to any individual result-
ing from asbestos exposure unless that individual’s alleged exposure oc-
curred while the individual was at the premises owner’s property.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.941 (West 2016).
134. See Kotlarsky, supra note 40, at 488 (asserting duty analysis courts have
taken on in toxic tort theory litigation is lengthy and unnecessary).  Kotlarsky
states:
In courts’ efforts either to impose a duty or deny a duty in take-home
asbestos cases, they have engaged in unclear analyses and set bad prece-
dents for future cases.  Courts that find that a duty existed rely on fact-
specific inquiries like foreseeability that usurp the role of the jury, while
courts that deny duty hide their policy determinations behind legal doc-
trines like nonfeasance and a lack of relationship between the parties.
Id.
135. For a further discussion of the decision in Schwartz, see supra notes 90–96
and accompanying text.
136. For further discussion of limitless liability, see supra notes 124 and 128
and accompanying text.  The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that the exten-
sion of duty will not create limitless liability because the duty is “focused on the
particularized foreseeability of harm” of the person in the circumstances. See Olivo
v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1150 (N.J. 2006) (holding Exxon’s fear of “limit-
less exposure” to be unfounded in circumstances).
137. For a further discussion of the importance of considering other factors
besides foreseeability in determining duty of care, see supra note 127 and accompa-
nying text.
138. For a discussion of why employers are in the best position to prevent
harm and take precautions, see supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
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However, if other jurisdictions were to adopt the Schwartz holding,
litigation would greatly increase in the area of law that already features the
longest running mass tort litigation.139  It will allow more injured plaintiffs
to bring claims against not only their spouses’ employers, but also manu-
facturers and premises owners because they have a similar duty.140  Sec-
ond, it will lead to a more complex and lengthy analysis of duty.141  The
necessity of weighing the factors set forth in Schwartz before making a de-
termination of duty will result in a reduced number of early dismissals in
take-home toxic tort cases, allow for wider discretion within these deci-
sions, and, perhaps, lead to discrepancies between courts.142
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decisions in Olivo and Schwartz could
influence the decision of other jurisdictions deciding the same issue; in
fact, there are a number of different jurisdictions that have similar cases
pending.143  The California Supreme Court heard arguments in Septem-
ber of 2016 on this exact issue and made a decision in December of
139. See Suna Lee, NJ Supreme Court Opens Door to More Take-Home Exposure
Claims Against Landowners, WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP
(Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.wilsonelser.com/news_and_insights/client_alerts/268
2-nj_supreme_court_opens_door_to_more_take-home [https://perma.cc/NT3U-
HTGU] (outlining effects of Schwartz).  Because of the decision in Schwartz, it will
be more difficult for defendants to convince courts to grant “early dismissals of
claims filed by non-spouses.” See id.
 Because “liability to a non-spouse is . . . [now] a fact question for which dis-
covery is needed,” defendants cannot move to dismiss cases “based upon marital
status alone.”  Id.  Furthermore, due to the lengthy and complicated duty analysis,
courts may be inclined to grant summary judgment motions less often. See id.
140. See Tom Johnson, State’s High Court Lays Down New Law on Liability For
Toxic Exposure, NJ SPOTLIGHT (July 7, 2016), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/
16/07/06/state-s-high-court-lays-down-new-law-on-liability-for-toxic-exposure/
[https://perma.cc/UMP4-2F46] (asserting New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision
in Schwartz will open up door to litigation and “increase liability” in take-home
toxic tort cases).
141. For further details of the more lengthy and complicated duty analysis,
including the factors analyzed, see supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text.
142. See Peter Hayes, Fewer Early Dismissals Predicted for New Jersey Toxic Take
Home Suits, BLOOMBERG BNA TOXICS L. REP. (July 14, 2016), https://www.tuckerel-
lis.com/userfiles/file/Accuratus_7_7_16.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNY7-X8DF]
(predicting extension of liability will lead to fewer summary judgment motions
being granted).
143. See Howard Fischer, Court: Arizona Companies Not Liable for Asbestos Taken
Home on Clothing, TUSCON.COM, (Sept. 20, 2016), http://tucson.com/business/tuc
son/court-arizona-companies-not-liable-for-asbestos-taken-home-on/article_ea192
512-308b-5770-80cf-3997a4ec121f.html [https://perma.cc/332W-4VPM] (detailing
new decision in take-home toxic tort litigation from Arizona Court of Appeals).
The Arizona Court of Appeals ruled in September of 2016 that “companies have
no duty to protect family members from exposure to toxic materials their employ-
ees bring home on their work clothes.” See id.  The court reasoned that making
companies responsible for injuries that were the result of second-hand exposure to
chemical or toxic products would “open the door for claims by people who came
into contact with asbestos-tainted clothing in a taxicab, grocery store, dry cleaner,
convenience store or laundromat.” See id.
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2016.144  Following in the footsteps of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the
California Supreme Court held that the duty of employers to “prevent
take-home exposure” extends not only to employees, but members of the
employee’s household, regardless of their relationship.145  How other ju-
risdictions will rule and the future of this issue is unclear, but we do know
one thing for sure: laundry has become a bit more dangerous than we
thought.
144. See Kesner v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 4th 251, 261 (Ct. App. 2014)
(holding manufacturer owed duty of care to employee’s nephew to avoid harm
from secondary exposure to asbestos), vacated, 384 P.3d 283 (Cal. 2016).  The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals held:
In concluding that Abex’s duty of care extends to Kesner, a long-term
guest in the home of Abex’s employee, we emphasize that our ruling is
based on the assumption, required by the standard for reviewing the suffi-
ciency of the allegations of a complaint, that Kesner’s contact with his
uncle was extensive.  As to such persons, the foreseeability of harm is sub-
stantial.  As to persons whose contact with an employer’s worker is only
casual or incidental, the foreseeability of harm and the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury
may be so minimal . . . .
Id. (holding there is duty because harm was foreseeable); see also Haver v. BNSF Ry.
Co., 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 771 (Cal Ct. App., 2014) (holding employer lacked duty not
to expose employee’s wife to asbestos), rev’d, Kesner, 384 P.3d 283.
145. See Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 305 (Cal. 2016).  The Califor-
nia Supreme Court stated:
We hold that the duty of employers and premises owners to exercise ordi-
nary care in their use of asbestos includes preventing exposure to asbes-
tos carried by the bodies and clothing of on-site workers.  Where it is
reasonably foreseeable that workers, their clothing, or personal effects
will act as vectors carrying asbestos from the premises to household mem-
bers, employers have a duty to take reasonable care to prevent this means
of transmission . . . .  Importantly, we hold that this duty extends only to
members of a worker’s household.  Because the duty is premised on the
foreseeability of both the regularity and intensity of contact that occurs in
a worker’s home, it does not extend beyond this circumscribed category
of potential plaintiffs.
Id. at 288 (holding employer has duty to employee’s household members because
injury is foreseeable).
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